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Abstract
We review and develop a selection of models of systems with competition and
cooperation, with origins in economics, where deep insights can be obtained by the
mathematical methods of game theory. Some of these models were touched upon
in authors’ book ’Understanding Game Theory’, World Scientific 2010, where also
the necessary background on games can be found.
Key words: Bi-matrix inspection games, territorial price building, tax evasion, von
Neumann - Morgenstern set, two-action multi-agent games, nonlinear Markov games,
colored (or rainbow) options, geometry of risk-neutral laws
We review and develop below some models of competition and cooperation, with
origins in economics. These models are linked only ideologically and methodologically,
which allows one to read all sections almost independently.
1 Territorial price building
Here we present a variation of the classical Cournot model of price building, where selling
and production sites are spatially distributed.
Suppose there is a market that include selling sites M1, . . . ,Mm, products 1, . . . , K
and production sites 1, ..., L.
There are N agents that buy the products at the production sites and sell them in
M1, . . . ,Mm.
Assume that at the each production site l there is a large stock of all products available
at the price pkl for the unit of the product k, and that the transportation cost to Mi of a
unit of the product k is ξikl.
Let Y nikl denote the amount of the product k, which the agent n brought to Mi from
the site l. Then the total amount of kth product in Mi is
Yik =
N∑
n=1
Y nik, Y
n
ik =
L∑
l=1
Y nikl.
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The selling price of the product k in Mi is the function of the total supply of the product.
Following the standard Cournot model assume that this price is given by the formula
Rik(Yik) = (1− Yik/αik)βik, Yik ∈ [0, αik],
with some positive constants αik, βik.
Then the total income of the player n can be calculated by the formula
Hn =
m∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
Hn(ik) (1)
with
Hn(ik) = Y
n
ik
(
1−
Yik
αik
)
βik −
L∑
l=1
Y nikl(ξikl + pkl), Yik ∈ [0, αik]. (2)
Thus we have defined a symmetric N -person game ΓN with the payoffs given by (1) and
with the strategies of each player n being the arrays (Y nikl) with positive entries bounded
by αik.
For simplicity we reduce our attention to the case of 2 players.
Proposition 1.1. The game Γ2 has a symmetric Nash equilibrium. If for each pair (i, k)
there exists a unique l = q(i, k) where the minimum of ξikl + pkl is attained, then this
equilibrium is unique and the corresponding strategies of each player are given by
Yˆik =
1
3
δlq(i,k)αik
(
1−
ξikl + pkl
βik
)
, (3)
where δlm denotes the usual Dirac symbol that equals 1 for l = m and zero otherwise.
Proof. Clearly looking for a best reply one has to maximize each Hn(ik) separately for
each pair (ik). It is also clear from (2) that to have a best reply one has to bring the
product only from those sites that minimize ξikl + pkl. Hence given (Y
1
ik) to find the best
reply of the second player one has to find the maximum of the functions
H¯ ik2 (Y
2
ikq(i,k)) = Y
n
ikq(i,k))
(
1−
Y 1ik + Y
2
ikq(i,k)
αik
)
βik − Y
n
ikq(i,k)(ξikq(i,k) + pkq(i,k))
for each pair (ik). Differentiating one gets
dH¯ ik2 (z)
dz
=
(
1−
Y 1ik + z
αik
)
βik − (ξikq(i,k) + pkq(i,k))− z
βik
αik
= 0
for the best reply z = Y 2ikq(i,k), yielding
Y 2ikq(i,k) =
1
2
αik
(
1−
Y 1ik
αik
−
ξikq(i,k) + pkq(i,k)
βik
)
. (4)
As the second derivatives of H¯ ik2 is negative this point does really define a maximum (and
not a minimum). By the symmetry one concludes that symmetric equilibrium strategy
solves the equation
Yˆik =
1
2
αik
(
1−
Yˆik
αik
−
ξikq(i,k) + pkq(i,k)
βik
)
(5)
and thus equals (3) as required.
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2 Bi-matrix inspection games
In this and the next sections we develop some extensions of the classical inspection game.
For other similar models see [1], [2], [5], [10] and references therein.
The game is carried out between a trespasser (player I) and an inspector(player II)
in n-periods (or steps). We shall analyze a ’stop to abuses’ version of this game when it
lasts only till the first time trespassing is discovered by the inspector.
Player I has 2 pure strategies: to break (violate) the law (B) or to refrain from it (R).
Player II has also 2 pure strategies: to check the actions of player I (C) or to have a rest
(R). If player I chooses (R) he gets the legal income r > 0. If he chooses (B), he obtains
additionally the illegal surplus s > 0. However, if his illegal action is discovered by player
II, the player I pays the fine f > 0 and the game is over.
If player II chooses (C) he spends the amount c > 0 on this procedure and can discover
the trespassing of player I with the probability p(p = 1 − p). If player I breaks the law
and this action is not discovered, the inspector loses the amount l > 0.
Consequently one step of this game can be described by the table
Inspector
Trespasser
Check (C) Rest (R)
Break (B) −pf + p(r + s),−(c+ pl) r + s,−l
Refrain (R) r,−c r, 0
or shortly by the matrix(
−pf + p(r + s),−(c+ pl) r + s,−l
r,−c r, 0
)
(6)
It is natural to assume, that c < pl, so that the pair (B,R) is not a Nash equilibrium
(otherwise the inspector has no reasons at all to conduct checks).
Let us say that a bi-matrix game has a value, if payoffs in any of the existing Nash
equilibrium are the same, the corresponding pair of payoffs being called the value of the
game.
Proposition 2.1. Assume f, r, s, c, l > 0, c < pl. Then the game with the matrix (6) has
a value V = (u, v). Moreover, 1) if s < s1 =
p
p
(f + r), the unique Nash equilibrium is
given by the pair of mixed strategies (x, x), (y, y), where
x =
c
pl
, y =
s
p(f + r + s)
; u = r, v = −
c
p
.
2) if s > s1, the unique Nash equilibrium is the profile (B,C) and
u = −pf + p(r + s), v = −(c+ pl);
3) if s = s1, then u = r, v = −(c + pl) and the Nash equilibria are given by all pairs
(X,C), where X is any (pure or mixed) strategy of the trespasser.
Proof. Clearly the only candidate for Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is the pair
(B,C). This profile is an equilibrium if and only if s ≥ s1. Formulae for x, y follow from
the standard expression for mixed strategy profiles in two-action two-player games. Other
statements are checked by a straightforward inspection.
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Of course of greater interest is the analysis of a multi-step version of this game. Let us
consider the n-step game, where during this time the player I can break the law at most
k times and the player II can organize the check at most m times. Assume that after the
end of each period (step), the result becomes known to both players. Total payoff in n
steps equals the sum of payoffs in each step. It is also assumed that all this information
(rules of the game) is available to both players.
Let us denote the game described above by Γk,m(n). Let (uk,m(n), vk,m(n)) be the
value of this game. We then get the following system of recurrent equations:
(uk,m(n), vk,m(n))
= V al

 −pf + p(r + s+ uk−1,m−1(n− 1)), r + s+ uk−1,m(n− 1),−(c + pl) + pvk−1,m−1(n− 1) −l + vk−1,m(n− 1)
r + uk,m−1(n− 1),−c+ vk,m−1(n− 1) r + uk,m(n− 1), vk,m(n− 1)

 (7)
(if all Γk,m(n) have values, i.e. their equilibrium payoffs are uniquely defined), with the
boundary conditions (m,n, k ≥ 0):
(u0,m(n), v0,m(n)) = (nr, 0); (8)
(uk,0(n), vk,0(n)) = (nr + ks,−kl); k ≤ n, (9)
reflecting the following considerations: if the trespasser is unable to break the law, the
pair of solutions (R,R) will be repeated over all periods; and if the inspector is unable to
check, the trespasser will commit the maximum number of violations available.
Though k ≤ n,m ≥ n, the form of the recurrent equations below is slightly simplified
if one allows all non-negative k,m, n together with the agreement
(uk,m(n), vk,m(n)) = (uk′,m′(n), vk′,m′(n)); k
′ = min(k, n), m′ = min(m,n) (10)
Let us reduce our attention further to the game Γn,n(n). Let us write Un = un,n(n)
and Vn = vn,n(n). Then (7) takes the form:
(Un, Vn) = (Un−1, Vn−1) + V alMn, (11)
where
Mn =
(
p(r + s)− p(f + Un−1),−(c+ pl + pVn−1) r + s,−l
r,−c r, 0
)
(12)
(n ≥ 0; U0 = V0 = 0)
For n = 1 the game becomes the same as the game (6), and its solution is given by
Proposition 2.1.
Let us find the solution to the game Γ2,2(2). Plugging the values U1 and V1 into M2
yields
M2 =
(
p(r + s)− p(f + r),−pl r + s,−l
r,−c r, 0
)
, 0 < s < s1;
M2 =
(
p(−pf + p(r + s)),−p(c+ pl) r + s,−l
r,−c r, 0
)
, s > s1;
4
s2 =
p
p
(f + r) +
p
p2
r.
Direct calculations show that under the assumptions of Proposition 2.1 the M2 also
has a value, and one can distinguish three basic cases (equilibrium strategies are again
denoted by (x, x), (y, y)):
1) if 0 < s < s1, then
x =
c
pl + c
, y =
s
p(f + 2r + s)
; U2 = 2r, V2 = −
c(2pl + c)
p(pl + c)
2) if s1 < s < s2, then
x =
c
p(c+ (1 + p)l)
, y =
s
p(pf + (1 + p)(r + s))
;
U2 = −pf + p(r + s), V2 = −(
cl
p(c+ (1 + p)l)
+ c + pl)
3) if s > s2, then
U2 = (1 + p)(−pf + p(r + s)), V2 = −(1 + p)(c+ pl),
and the profile (B,C) is an equilibrium.
Analogously one can calculate the solutions for other n > 2.
3 Tax payer against a tax man
This is a game between a tax payer (player I) and the tax police (player II). Player I has
2 pure strategies: to hide part of the taxes (H) or to pay them in full (P). Player II has
also 2 strategies: to check player I (C) and to rest (R). Player I gets the income r if he
pays the tax in full. If he chooses the action (H), he gets the additional surplus l. But if
he is caught by player II, he has to pay the fine f .
In the profile (C,H) player II can discover the unlawful action of player I with the
probability p(p = 1 − p), so that p can be called the efficiency of the police. Choosing
(C), player II spends c on the checking procedure. Of course l, r, f, c > 0.
Hence we defined a bi-matrix game given by the table
Player II (Police)
Player I
Check (C) Rest (R)
Hide (H) r + pl − pf,−c+ pf − pl r + l,−l
Pay (P) r,−c r, 0
or shortly by the payoff matrix(
r + pl − pf,−c+ pf − pl r + l,−l
r,−c r, 0
)
(13)
The candidates to the mixed equilibrium are the strategies (β, β), (α, α), where
α =
a22 − a12
a11 − a12 − a21 + a22
=
l
p(l + f)
> 0
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β =
b22 − b21
b11 − b12 − b21 + b22
=
c
p(l + f)
> 0.
In order to have these strategies well defined, it is necessary to have α < 1 and β < 1
respectively. By a direct inspection one gets the following result.
Proposition 3.1. 1) If c ≥ p(f + l), the pair (H,R) is an equilibrium, and moreover the
strategy (R) is dominant for the police (even strictly, if the previous inequality is strict).
2) If c < p(f + l) and fp ≤ pl, the pair (H,C) is an equilibrium and the strategy (H) is
dominant (strictly if the previous inequality is strict). 3) If c < p(f + l), fp > pl, then
the unique Nash equilibrium is the profile of mixed strategies (β, β), (α, α).
Remarks. 1. Consequently, in cases 1) and 2) the actions of the police are not
effective. 2. It is not difficult to show that the equilibrium in case 3) is stable.
It is more interesting to analyze the game obtained by extending the strategy space
of player I by allowing him to choose the amount l of tax evasion: l ∈ [0, lM ], where lM
is the full tax due to player I. For example, we shall assume that the fine is proportional
to l, i.e. f(l) = nl. Say, in the Russian tax legislation n = 0.4. Under these assumptions
the key coefficients α, β take the form
α =
1
p(n+ 1)
, β =
c
l
1
p(n + 1)
.
Let HI(l) denote the payoff to player I in the equilibrium when l is chosen. One can
distinguish two cases:
1) p > 1
n+1
⇐⇒ α < 1. If
l > l1 =
c
p(n+ 1)
⇐⇒ β < 1,
then (β, β), (α, α) is a stable equilibrium. If l < l1 ⇐⇒ β > 1, then (H,R) is a stable
equilibrium. Since
HI(l < l1) = r + l < r + l1,
HI(l > l1) = βα(r + pl − pf) + βα(r + l) + βαr + βαr = r + βl(αp+ α− αpn),
it follows that HI(l > l1) > HI(l < l1) would be possible whenever βl(αp+α−αpn) ≥ l1.
However αp+α−αpn = 0, hence this is not the case. Consequently HI(l > l1) < HI(l < l1)
and therefore player I will avoid tax on the amount l = l1.
2) p < 1
n+1
⇐⇒ α > 1.
If l > l1 ⇐⇒ β < 1, then (H,C) is an equilibrium, and if l < l1 ⇔ β > 1, then (H,R)
is an equilibrium. Since
HI(l < l1) = r + l < r + l1, HI(l > l1) = r + (1− p)l − pln,
the choice l > l1 is reasonable for player I as
l(1− p− pn) ≥ l1.
Hence HI(l > l1) > HI(l < l1) whenever l ≥
l1
1−p(n+1)
.
Consequently, if
l1
1− p(n+ 1)
≤ lM , (14)
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the equilibrium strategy for player I is l = lM and otherwise l = l1.
One can conclude that in both cases it is profitable to avoid tax on the amount l1, but
as the efficiency of tax man increases, it becomes unreasonable to avoid tax on a higher
amount.
Let us see which condition in the second case would ensure the inequality (14) when
the amount of tax avoidance is lM in the equilibrium. Plugging l1 in (14) yields
c
p(n + 1)(1− p(n+ 1))
≤ lM .
Denoting x = p(n+ 1) < 1 one can rewrite it as
x2 − x+
c
lM
≤ 0. (15)
The roots of the corresponding equation are
x1,2 =
1±
√
1− 4c
lM
2
.
Hence for c > lM/4 inequality (14) does not hold for any p, and for c ≤ lM/4 the solution
to (15) is
x ∈

1−
√
1− 4c
lM
2
;
1−
√
1 + 4c
lM
2

 .
Thus for
c ≤
lM
4
, p ∈

1−
√
1− 4c
lM
2(n + 1)
;
1−
√
1 + 4c
lM
2(n+ 1)

 (16)
it is profitable to avoid tax payment on the amount lM .
Let us consider a numeric example with n = 0.4 so that 1/(n + 1) = 0.714. If, say,
c = 1000, then lM = 100000.
1) If p < 0.714, the condition c ≤ lM/4 holds true, as 1000 < 2500. Hence, for
p ∈ [0.007; 0.707] it is profitable to avoid tax on the whole amount, i.e. 100000.
2) If p > 0.714 it is profitable to avoid tax on the amount l1 = 714.29.
Hence if the efficiency of tax payment checks is p < 0.707, it is profitable to avoid tax
on the whole amount of 100000, and if p > 0.707, then not more than on 1010.
4 Cooperative games versus zero-sum games
The aim of this Section is to present a curious connection between competition and
cooperation by linking the solutions to cooperative games and lower values of auxiliary
zero-sum games. The following definitions are standard:
Cooperative game with non-transferable utility is a triple G = (I, v,H), where I =
{1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players, H is a non-empty compact set from Rn, and v is a
mapping from the set of all coalitions (non-empty subset S ⊂ I) to the set of non-empty
closed subsets v(S) ⊂ H .
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For x, y ∈ H one says that x dominates y (x ≻ y), if there exists a coalition S ⊆ I
such that
1) x, y ∈ v(S);
2) xi > yi for any i ∈ S.
A (von Neumann - Morgenstern) solution to G = (I, v,H) is called a subset V ⊆ H
such that
1) (internal stability) there are no pairs of vectors from V such that one of them
dominates the other one;
2) (external stability) for any y ∈ H\V there exists x ∈ V such that x ≻ y.
For A ⊂ Rn let us denote by Aε the ε-neighborhood of A, i.e. Aε = A+Bε with
Bε =
{
x ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
x2i < ε
}
.
A closed subset V is called a ε-solution whenever V is internally stable and for any
y ∈ H\Vε there exists x ∈ V such that x ≻ y.
It is clear that if a closed A is a ε-solution in the game G = (I, v,H) for any ε > 0,
the A is a solution.
Consider the function
L(x, y) = max
S:x,y∈v(S)
min
i∈S
(xi − yi).
It is clear that L(x, y) > 0⇔ x ≻ y. Let A(G) = {B ∈ 2H : B , max
x,y∈B
L(x, y) = 0}.
Proposition 4.1. Let ε > 0. The game G = (I, v,H) has a ε-solution if and only if
sup
A∈A(G)
{ min
y∈H\Aε
max
x∈A
L(x, y)} > 0. (17)
Proof. Let (17) holds. Then there exist A ⊆ H such that
min
y∈H\Aε
max
x∈A
L(x, y) > 0 (18)
and
max
x,y∈A
L(x, y) = 0. (19)
It follows from (18) that max
x∈A
L(x, y) > 0 for each y ∈ H\Aε. Consequently for arbitrary
y ∈ H\Aε one can find a x ∈ A such that L(x, y) > 0, i.e. x ≻ y. It now follows from (19)
that L(x, y) ≤ 0 for all x, y ∈ A, i.e. neither x dominates y, nor vice versa. Consequently
the set A is a ε-solution.
Now let A is a ε-solution. Then L(x, y) ≤ 0 for all x, y ∈ A, but L(x, x) = 0 implying
(19).
With A being a ε-solution, for any y ∈ H\Aε there exists a x ∈ A such that x ≻ y,
i.e. L(x, y) > 0. Consequently max
x∈A
L(x, y) > 0 for any y ∈ H\Aε and therefore
min
y∈H\Aε
max
x∈A
L(x, y) > 0.
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Let us choose now a ε > 0 and introduce a two-person zero-sum game Γε(I, v,H),
in which the first player makes a first move by choosing a A ∈ A and then the second
player replies by choosing y ∈ H\Aε. Finally the first player makes the third (and the
last) move by choosing x ∈ A. The income of the first player in this game equals L(x, y)
(the second one gets −L(x, y)).
The following statement is a direct corollary of Proposition 4.1.
Proposition 4.2. The game G = (I, v,H) has a ε-solution if and only if the maximal
guaranteed gain of the first plater in Γε(I, v,H) is positive. Moreover any A ∈ A yielding
such gain is a ε-solution to G.
One can now define a two-player zero-sum game in the normal form Nε(I, v,H), where
the strategies of the first players are the sets A ∈ A and the strategies of the second player
are the mappings f : A ∈ A 7→ H\Aε. Let F denote the set of the strategies of the second
player. Let the payoff to the first player in this game Nε(I, v,H) be
h(A, f) = max
x∈A
L(x, f(A)).
Proposition 4.3. The game Nε(I, v,H) has a value, i.e.
sup
A∈A
inf
f∈F
h(A, f) = inf
f∈F
sup
A∈A
h(A, f).
Proof. Consider the strategy f ∗ such that
min
y∈H\Aε
max
x∈A
L(x, y) = max
x∈A
L(x, f ∗(A))
for any A ∈ A.
Then
sup
A∈A
inf
f∈F
h(A, f) ≤ inf
f∈F
sup
A∈A
h(A, f) ≤ sup
A∈A
h(A, f ∗) =
= sup
A∈A
max
x∈A
L(x, f ∗(A)) = sup
A∈A
min
y∈H\Aε
max
x∈A
L(x, y) = sup
A∈A
inf
f∈F
h(A, f).
Theorem 4.1. ([11]) The game G = (I, v,H) has a ε-solution if and only if
sup
A∈A
inf
f∈F
h(A, f) > 0
holds for the game Nε(I, v,H).
Proof. Follows from Proposition 4.1, 4.3.
5 Stability for two-action multi-agent games
One of the most popular game in recent game-theoretic literature is the so called minority
game, see [4]. It represents a particular game of many agents with each agent having two
strategies. With this motivation, we are going to analyze here the stability property of
games with two actions of each player.
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To prepare the stage for our analysis, let us consider a general non-symmetric game
Γ of m agents, where each agent j has nj strategies {s
k
j}, k = 1, · · · , nj, and receives
payoffs Πj(s
j1
1 , s
j2
2 , · · · , s
jm
m ) at a profile (s
j1
1 , s
j2
2 , · · · , s
jm
m ). Then, for a mixed strategy
profile σ = (σ1, σ2, ..., σm) with
σ1 = (x
1
1, ..., x
1
n1
), σ2 = (x
2
1, ..., x
2
n2
), ..., σm = (x
m
1 , ..., x
m
nm)
the payoff of agent j becomes
Πi(σ1, σ2, ..., σm) =
n1∑
j1=1
n2∑
j2=1
...
nm∑
jm=1
x1j1x
2
j2
...xmjmΠi(s
j1
1 , s
j2
2 , ..., s
jm
m ). (20)
The Replicator Dynamics (RD) equations have the form
x˙ji = (Πj(s
i
j, σ−j)− Πj(σj , σ−j))x
j
i , i = 1, ..., nj , j = 1, ..., m, (21)
where σ−j denotes the collection of the strategies of all players in σ others than j. This
system describes an evolution of the behavior of the players applying a try-and-error
method of shifting the strategies in the direction of a better payoff. As is well known, a
Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of system (21). The r.h.s of (21) is sometimes called the
Nash vector field of the game.
Recall that a Nash equilibrium for a game Γ is called asymptotically stable, neutrally
stable or unstable in the Lyapunov sense (or dynamically) if it so for the corresponding
dynamics (21). (This means roughly speaking that if starting with strategies near the
equilibrium, players would adjust their strategies in the direction of better payoffs, their
strategies would converge to this equilibrium.) On the other hand, a Nash equilibrium
(σ1, ..., σm) in such game is called structurally stable if for arbitrary ǫ > 0 there exists a
δ > 0 such that for all games Γ˜ with the same number of players and pure strategies and
with payoffs Π˜ that differ from Π no more than by δ, i.e. such that
|Πi(s
j1
1 , s
j2
2 , ..., s
jm
m )− Π˜i(s
j1
1 , s
j2
2 , ..., s
jm
m )| < δ (22)
for all i, sj11 , s
j2
2 , ..., s
jm
m , there exists a Nash equilibrium (σ˜1, ..., σ˜m) for the game Γ˜ such
that |σ˜j−σj | < ǫ for all j = 1, ..., m. It makes sense also to speak about structural stability
of dynamically stable or unstable equilibria, i.e. a dynamically stable (or unstable) Nash
equilibrium (σ1, ..., σm) in a game Γ is called structurally stable if for arbitrary ǫ > 0
there exists a δ > 0 such that for all games Γ˜ with the same number of players and pure
strategies and with payoffs Π˜ that differ from Π no more than by δ (i.e. (22) holds), there
exists a dynamically stable (respectively unstable) Nash equilibrium (σ˜1, ..., σ˜m) for the
game Γ˜ such that |σ˜j − σj | < ǫ for all j = 1, ..., m.
The notion of stability is closely related to another important notion of a generic
property: a property (object or characteristics) in a class of structures parametrized by a
collection of real numbers s from a given subset S of a Euclidean space is called generic
if it holds for s from a subset S˜ ⊂ S that is both open (which means that if s0 ∈ S˜, then
all s ∈ S that are closed enough to s0 belong to S˜ as well, i.e. the property of being in S˜
is structurally stable in any point s ∈ S˜) and dense (which means that for any s0 there
exists an s ∈ S˜ that is arbitrary close to s0, i.e. the negation of being in S˜ is nowhere
structurally stable).
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As mentioned above, we are going to concentrate on the class Γ2n of mixed strategy
extensions of games of n players each having only two strategies.
Let Aij1,...,jn denote the payoff to i under pure profile {j1, ..., jn}, jk = 1, 2. A mixed
strategy profile can be described by families
σ1 = (x1, 1− x1), σ2 = (x2, 1− x2), ..., σn = (xn, 1− xn).
Equations (21) can be written in terms of x1, ..., xn yielding (check it!)
x˙i = xi(1− xi)
∑
I∈{1,...,n}\i
A˜iI
∏
k∈I
xk
∏
k/∈I
(1− xk), i = 1, ..., n, (23)
where
A˜iI = A
i
j1...ji−11ji+1...jn
− Aij1...ji−12ji+1...jn
with jk = 1 whenever k ∈ I and jk = 2 otherwise. Hence pure mixed (i.e. with all
probabilities being positive) Nash equilibria for a game in Γ2n are given by vectors x
⋆ =
(x⋆1, ..., x
⋆
n) with coordinates from (0, 1) solving the following system of n equations∑
I∈{1,...,n}\i
A˜iI
∏
k∈I
xk
∏
k/∈I
(1− xk) = 0, i = 1, ..., n. (24)
In particular for n = 3, denoting x1, x2, x3 by x, y, z and arrows of payoffs A
1, A2, A3 by
A,B,C yields for system (23) the following explicit form

x˙ = x(1− x)(a + A2y + A3z + Ayz), 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
y˙ = y(1− y)(b+B1x+B3z +Bxz), 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
z˙ = z(1 − z)(c+ C1x+ C2y + Cxy), 0 ≤ z ≤ 1
(25)
as well as the form 

a+ A2y + A3z + Ayz = 0
b+ B1x+B3z +Bxz = 0
c+ C1x+ C2y + Cxy = 0
(26)
for system (24), where
a = A122 − A222, A2 = A112 − A212 − a, A3 = A121 − A221 − a,
A = A111 −A211 − a− A2 −A3,
and the coefficients in other two lines are defined analogously.
Assuming x⋆ = (x⋆1, ..., x
⋆
n) solves (24), it is convenient to rewrite system (23) in terms
of the deviations from the equilibrium ξi = xi − x
⋆
i . One then sees by inspection that the
matrix of linear approximation (the Jacobian matrix) J⋆ has the entries
J⋆ij = x
⋆
i (1− x
⋆
i )
∑
I∈{1,...,n}\{i,j}
(A˜iI∪j − A˜
i
I)
∏
k∈I
x⋆k
∏
k/∈(I∪{i,j})
(1− x⋆k) (27)
for i 6= j and J⋆ii = 0 for all i.
Theorem 5.1. Let J⋆ be the Jacobian matrix (described in Exercise 9.12) of a pure mixed
equilibrium x⋆ = (x⋆1, ..., x
⋆
n) solving (24). If at least one of the eigenvalues of J
⋆ has a
non-vanishing real part, then x⋆ is unstable in Lyapunov sense (i.e. dynamically). In
particular, if n is an odd number, then a necessary condition for the Liapunov stability of
x⋆ is the degeneracy of J⋆, that is det J⋆ = 0.
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Proof. From (27) one deduces that J⋆ has zeros on the main diagonal. Hence the sum of
its eigenvalues vanishes. Consequently if there exists an eigenvalue with a non-vanishing
real part there should necessarily exist also an eigenvalue with a positive real part, which
implies instability. As eigenvalues with vanishing real parts appear as pairs of conjugate
imaginary numbers, it follows that in case of odd n the fact that all real parts vanish
implies that zero should be an eigenvalue, i.e. the degeneracy of J⋆.
Let us write down the condition det J⋆ = 0 explicitly (i.e. in terms of the payoff
coefficients) for the case n = 3.
(i) From (27) the condition det J⋆ = 0 writes down as
(A2 + Az
⋆)(B3 +Bx
⋆)(C1 + Cy
⋆) + (B1 +Bz
⋆)(C2 + Cx
⋆)(A3 + Ay
⋆) = 0. (28)
(ii) Solving (26) by expressing y, z, in terms of x and putting this in the first equation
leads to the quadratic equation:
v(x⋆)2 + ux⋆ + w = 0, (29)
where
w = aC2B3 + cbA− bA3C2 − cA2B3, v = aBC + AB1C1 − BA2C1 − CA3B1,
u = a(BC2 + CB3) + b(AC1 − CA3) + c(AB1 −BA2)− A2B3C1 − A3B1C2.
(iii) Using the system that is solved by x⋆, y⋆, z⋆ to express y⋆z⋆ as a linear function
of y⋆, z⋆ allows to rewrite (28) as a quadratic equation (in x⋆, y⋆, z⋆). Expressing the
quadratic terms of this equation again via linear terms leads to the equation on x⋆ only:
u+ 2x⋆v = 0.
Comparing this with (29) leads to the conclusion that (28) is equivalent to the equation
u2 − 4vw = 0, (30)
which is a polynomial homogeneous equation of the sixth order in coefficients a, A,A2, A3,
b, B,B1, B3, c, C, C1, C2.
Corollary. The property to have a dynamically unstable pure mixed equilibrium is
generic among the games of type Γ23 that have pure mixed equilibria. More precisely, apart
from the games from the (algebraic of the sixth order) manifold M described by equation
(30) pure mixed equilibria are always dynamically unstable and structurally stable (as
dynamically unstable equilibria).
Proposition 5.1. Under the assumption (30) (or equivalently (28)) there exist α, β, γ
such that a function V of the (relative entropy) form
α[x⋆ ln x+(1−x⋆) ln(1−x)]+β[y⋆ ln y+(1−y⋆) ln(1−y)]+γ[z⋆ ln z+(1−z⋆) ln(1−z)] (31)
is a first integral for (25), i.e. it does not change along the trajectories of (25) (dV/dt = 0)
if and only if the condition
AB1C1 + aBC = BA2C1 + CA3B1 (32)
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holds. In the latter case
V = (B1 +Bz
⋆)(C1 + Cy
⋆)[x⋆ ln x+ (1− x⋆) ln(1− x)]
−(A2 + Az
⋆)(C1 + Cy
⋆)[y⋆ ln y + (1− y⋆) ln(1− y)]
−(A3 + Ay
⋆)(B1 +Bz
⋆)[z⋆ ln z + (1− z⋆) ln(1− z)]
is an integral.
Proof. Substituting (31) in the equation dV/dt = 0 that (31) is an integral of motion (25)
if and only if 

α(A2 + Az) + β(B1 +Bz) = 0
α(A3 + Ay) + γ(C1 + Cy) = 0
β(B3 +Bx) + γ(C2 + Cy) = 0
αA+ βB + γC = 0.
Expressing β, γ in terms of α from the first two equations one observes that the third
equation is then automatically satisfied due to (28). Solving the last equation leads to
(32).
Having a first integral V as above, allows one to conclude that the equilibrium (x⋆, y⋆, z⋆)
is neutrally stable in the Lyapunov sense.
6 Nonlinear Markov games
Nonlinear Markov games arise as a (competitive) controlled version of nonlinear Markov
processes (an emerging field of intensive research, see e.g. [8], [6] and references therein).
This class of games can model a variety of situation for economics and epidemics, statis-
tical physics, and pursuit - evasion processes.
A discrete-time, discrete-space nonlinear Markov semigroup Φk, k ∈ N, is specified by
an arbitrary continuous mapping Φ : Σn → Σn, where the simplex
Σn = {µ = (µ1, ..., µn) ∈ R
n
+ :
n∑
i=1
µi = 1}
represents the set of probability laws on the finite state space {1, ..., n}. For a measure
µ ∈ Σn the family µ
k = Φkµ can be considered an evolution of measures on {1, ..., n}.
But it does not yet define a random process, because finite-dimensional distributions are
not specified. In order to obtain a process we have to choose a stochastic representation
for Φ, i.e. to write it down in the form
Φ(µ) = {Φj(µ)}
n
j=1 = {
n∑
i=1
Pij(µ)µi}
n
j=1, (33)
where Pij(µ) is a family of stochastic matrices depending on µ (nonlinearity!), whose
elements specify the nonlinear transition probabilities. For any given Φ : Σn 7→ Σn a
representation (33) exists but is not unique. There exists a unique representation (33)
with the additional condition that all matrices Pij(µ) are one dimensional:
Pij(µ) = Φj(µ), i, j = 1, ..., n. (34)
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Once a stochastic representation (33) for a mapping Φ is chosen we can naturally define,
for any initial probability law µ = µ0, a stochastic process il, l ∈ Z+, called a nonlinear
Markov chain, on {1, ..., n} in the following way. Starting with an initial position i0 dis-
tributed according to µ we then choose the next point i1 according to the law {Pi0j(µ)}
n
j=1,
the distribution of i1 becoming µ
1 = Φ(µ):
µ1j = P(i1 = j) =
n∑
i=1
Pij(µ)µi = Φj(µ).
Then we choose i2 according to the law {Pi1j(µ
1)}nj=1, and so on. The law of this process
at any given time k is µk = Φk(µ); that is, it is given by the semigroup. However, now
the finite-dimensional distributions are defined as well. Namely, say for a function f of
two discrete variables, we have
Ef(ik, ik+1) =
n∑
i,j=1
f(i, j)µkiPij(µ
k).
In other words, this process can be defined as a time nonhomogeneous Markov chain with
transition probabilities Pij(µ
k) at time t = k.
We turn now to nonlinear chains in continuous time. A nonlinear Markov semigroup in
continuous time and with finite state space {1, ..., n} is defined as a semigroup Φt, t ≥ 0,
of continuous transformations of Σn. As in the case of discrete time the semigroup itself
does not specify a process. To get a process, assume the semigroup Φt is differentiable in
t, so that we can define the (nonlinear) infinitesimal generator of the semigroup Φt as the
nonlinear operator on measures given by
A(µ) =
d
dt
Φt|t=0(µ).
The semigroup identity for Φt implies that Φt(µ) solves the Cauchy problem
d
dt
Φt(µ) = A(Φt(µ)), Φ0(µ) = µ. (35)
As follows from the invariance of Σn under these dynamics, the mapping A is con-
ditionally positive in the sense that µi = 0 for a µ ∈ Σn implies Ai(µ) ≥ 0 and is also
conservative in the sense that A maps the measures from Σn to the space of signed mea-
sures
Σ0n = {ν ∈ R
n :
n∑
i=1
νi = 0}.
We shall say that such a generator A has a stochastic representation if it can be written
in the form
Aj(µ) =
n∑
i=1
µiQij(µ) = (µQ(µ))j, (36)
where Q(µ) = {Qij(µ)} is a family of infinitesimally stochastic matrices (or Q=matrices)
depending on µ ∈ Σn. Thus in its stochastic representation the generator has the form of a
usual Markov chain generator, though depending additionally on the present distribution.
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The existence of a stochastic representation for the generator is not difficult to obtain,
see [8].
The examples of nonlinear Markov chains are numerous including Lotka-Volterra sys-
tems, general replicator dynamics of the evolutionary game theory, models of epidemics,
coagulation processes, see more in [8].
Now we discuss the corresponding nonlinear extension of controlled processes.
Nonlinear Markov games can be considered as a systematic tool for modeling decep-
tion. In particular, in a game of pursuit - evasion, an evading object can create false
objectives or hide in order to deceive the pursuit. Thus, observing this object leads not
to its precise location, but to its distribution only, implying that it is necessary to build
competitive control on the basis of the distribution of the present state. Moreover, by
observing the action of the evading objects, one can make conclusions about its certain
dynamic characteristics making the (predicted) transition probabilities depending on the
observed distribution via these characteristics. This is precisely the type of situations
modeled by nonlinear Markov games.
The starting point for the analysis is the observation that a nonlinear Markov semi-
group is after all just a deterministic dynamic system (though on a weird state space
of measures and with a specifically structured payoff function). Thus, as the stochastic
control theory is a natural extension of the deterministic control, we are going to further
extend it by turning back to deterministic control, but of measures, thus exemplifying the
usual spiral development of science. The next ’turn of the screw’ would lead to stochastic
measure-valued games forming a stochastic control counterpart for the class of processes
discussed in the previous section.
We shall work directly in the competitive control setting (game theory), which of
course includes the usual optimization as a particular case, but for simplicity only in
discrete time and finite original state space {1, ..., n}. The full state space is then chosen
as a set of probability measures Σn on {1, ..., n}.
Suppose we are given two metric spaces U , V of the control parameters of two players,
a continuous transition cost function g(u, v, µ), u ∈ U , v ∈ V , µ ∈ Σn and a transition
law ν(u, v, µ) prescribing the new state ν ∈ Σn obtained from µ once the players had
chosen their strategies u ∈ U, v ∈ V . The problem of the corresponding one-step game
(with sequential moves) consists in calculating the Bellman operator
(BS)(µ) = min
u
max
v
[g(u, v, µ) + S(ν(u, v, µ))] (37)
for a given final cost function S on Σn. According to the dynamic programming principle
(see e.g. [10]), the dynamic multi-step game solution is given by the iterations BkS. Often
of interest is the behavior of this optimal cost BkS(µ) as the number of steps k go to
infinity.
The function ν(u, v, µ) can be interpreted as the controlled version of the mapping Φ
specifying a nonlinear discrete time Markov semigroup. Assume a stochastic representa-
tion for this mapping is chosen, i.e.
νj(u, v, µ) =
n∑
i=1
µiPij(u, v, µ)
with a given family of (controlled) stochastic matrices Pij. Then it is natural to assume
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g to describe the average over the random transitions, i.e. be given by
g(u, v, µ) =
n∑
i,j=1
µiPij(u, v, µ)gij
with certain real coefficients gij. Under this assumption the Bellman operator (37) takes
the form
(BS)(µ) = min
u
max
v
[
n∑
i,j=1
µiPij(u, v, µ)gij + S
(
n∑
i=1
µiPi.(u, v, µ)
)
]. (38)
We can now identify the (not so obvious) place of the usual stochastic control theory
in this nonlinear setting. Namely, assume Pij above do not depend on µ. But even then
the set of the linear functions S(µ) =
∑n
i=1 siµ
i on measures (identified with the set of
vectors S = (s1, ..., sn)) is not invariant under B. Hence we are not automatically reduced
to the usual stochastic control setting, but to a game with incomplete information, where
the states are probability laws on {1, ..., n}, i.e. when choosing a move the players do
not know the position precisely, but only its distribution. Only if we allow only Dirac
measures µ as a state space (i.e. no uncertainty on the state), the Bellman operator would
be reduced to the usual one of the stochastic game theory:
(B¯S)i = min
u
max
v
n∑
j=1
Pij(u, v)(gij + Sj). (39)
As an example of a nonlinear result we shall get here an analog of the result on the
existence of the average income for long lasting games (see [8] for a proof).
Proposition 6.1. If the mapping ν is a contraction uniformly in u, v, i.e. if
‖ν(u, v, µ1)− ν(u, v, µ2)‖ ≤ δ‖µ1 − µ2‖ (40)
with a δ ∈ (0, 1), where ‖ν‖ =
∑n
i=1 |νi|, and if g is Lipschitz continuous, i.e.
‖g(u, v, µ1)− g(u, v, µ2)‖ ≤ C‖µ1 − µ2‖ (41)
with a constant C > 0, then there exists a unique λ ∈ R and a Lipschitz continuous
function S on Σn such that
B(S) = λ+ S, (42)
and for all g ∈ C(Σn) we have
‖Bmg −mλ‖ ≤ ‖S‖+ ‖S − g‖, (43)
lim
m→∞
Bmg
m
= λ. (44)
One can extend the other results for stochastic multi-step games to this nonlinear
setting, say, the turnpike theorems from [10], and then go on studying the nonlinear
Markov analogs of differential games.
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7 Colored options as a game against Nature
Here we introduce a game-theoretic analysis of rainbow options in incomplete markets.
Further developments can be found in [12], [3] and [9].
Recall that a European option is a contract between two parties where one party
has right to complete a transaction in the future (with previously agreed amount, date
and price) if he/ she chooses, but is not obliged to do so. More precisely, consider a
financial market dealing with several securities: the risk-free bonds (or bank account) and
J common stocks, J = 1, 2.... In case J > 1, the corresponding options are called colored
or rainbow options (J-colors option for a given J). Suppose the prices of the units of these
securities, Bm and S
i
m, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}, change in discrete moments of time m = 1, 2, ...
according to the recurrent equations Bm+1 = ρBm, where the ρ ≥ 1 is an interest rate
which remains unchanged over time, and Sim+1 = ξ
i
m+1S
i
m, where ξ
i
m, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}, are
unknown sequences taking values in some fixed intervals Mi = [di, ui] ⊂ R. This model
generalizes the colored version of the classical CRR model in a natural way. In the latter
a sequence ξim is confined to take values only among two boundary points di, ui, and it
is supposed to be random with some given distribution. In our model any value in the
interval [di, ui] is allowed and no probabilistic assumptions are made.
The type of an option is specified by a given premium function f of J variables. The
following are the standard examples:
option delivering the best of J risky assets and cash
f(S1, S2, ..., SJ) = max(S1, S2, ..., SJ , K), (45)
calls on the maximum of J risky assets
f(S1, S2, ..., SJ) = max(0,max(S1, S2, ..., SJ)−K), (46)
multiple-strike options
f(S1, S2, ..., SJ) = max(0, S1 −K1, S
2 −K2, ...., S
J −KJ), (47)
portfolio options
f(S1, S2, ..., SJ) = max(0, n1S
1 + n2S
2 + ... + nJS
J −K), (48)
and spread options
f(S1, S2) = max(0, (S2 − S1)−K). (49)
Here, the S1, S2, ..., SJ represent the (in principle unknown at the start) expiration
date values of the underlying assets, and K,K1, ..., KJ represent the (agreed from the
beginning) strike prices. The presence of max in all these formulae reflects the basic
assumption that the buyer is not obliged to exercise his/her right and would do it only in
case of a positive gain.
The investor is supposed to control the growth of his/her capital in the following way.
Let Xm denote the capital of the investor at the time m = 1, 2, .... At each time m−1 the
investor determines his portfolio by choosing the numbers γim of common stocks of each
kind to be held so that the structure of the capital is represented by the formula
17
Xm−1 =
J∑
j=1
γjmS
j
m−1 + (Xm−1 −
J∑
j=1
γjmS
j
m−1),
where the expression in brackets corresponds to the part of his capital held in the bank
account. The control parameters γjm can take all real values, i.e. short selling and bor-
rowing are allowed. The value ξm becomes known at the moment m and thus the capital
at the moment m becomes
Xm =
J∑
j=1
γjmξ
j
mS
j
m−1 + ρ(Xm−1 −
J∑
j=1
γjmS
j
m−1), (50)
if transaction costs are not taken into account.
If n is the prescribed maturity date, then this procedures repeats n times starting from
some initial capital X = X0 (selling price of an option) and at the end the investor is
obliged to pay the premium f to the buyer. Thus the (final) income of the investor equals
G(Xn, S
1
n, S
2
n, ..., S
J
n ) = Xn − f(S
1
n, S
2
n, ..., S
J
n). (51)
The evolution of the capital can thus be described by the n-step game of the investor
with Nature, the behavior of the latter being characterized by unknown parameters ξjm.
The strategy of the investor is by definition any sequences of vectors (γ1, · · · , γn) such that
each γm could be chosen using the whole previous information: the sequences X0, ..., Xm−1
and Si0, ..., S
j
m−1 (for every stock j = 1, 2, ..., J). The control parameters γ
j
m can take all
real values, i.e. short selling and borrowing are allowed. A position of the game at any
time m is characterized by J + 1 non-negative numbers Xm, S
1
m, · · · , S
J
m with the final
income specified by the function
G(X,S1, ..., SJ) = X − f(S1, ..., SJ). (52)
The main definition of the theory is as follows. A strategy γ1, · · · , γn, of the investor
is called a hedge, if for any sequence (ξ1, · · · , ξn) the investor is able to meet his/her
obligations, i.e.
G(Xn, S
1
n, ..., S
J
n ) ≥ 0.
The minimal value of the capital X0 for which the hedge exists is called the hedging price
H of an option.
Looking for the guaranteed payoffs means looking for the worst-case scenario (so called
robust-control approach), i.e. for the minimax strategies. Thus if the final income is
specified by a function G, the guaranteed income of the investor in a one-step game with
the initial conditions X,S1, ..., SJ is given by the Bellman operator
BG(X,S1, · · · , SJ) =
1
ρ
max
γ
min
{ξj∈[dj ,uj ]}
G(ρX +
J∑
i=1
γiξiSi − ρ
J∑
i=1
γiSi, ξ1S1, · · · , ξJSJ),
(53)
and (as it follows from the standard backward induction argument) the guaranteed income
of the investor in the n-step game with the initial conditions X0, S
1
0 , ..., S
J
0 is given by the
formula
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BnG(X0, S
1
0 , ..., S
J
0 ).
In our model G is given by (52). Clearly for G of the form
G(X,S1, · · · , SJ) = X − f(S1, · · · , SJ),
BG(X,S1, ..., SJ) = X −
1
ρ
min
γ
max
ξ
[f(ξ1S1, ξ2S2, · · · , ξJSJ)−
J∑
j=1
γjSj(ξj − ρ)],
and hence
BnG(X,S1, · · · , SJ) = X −
1
ρn
(Bnf)(S1, · · · , SJ),
where the reduced Bellman operator is defined as:
(Bf)(z1, ..., zJ ) = min
γ
max
{ξj∈[dj ,uj ]}
[f(ξ1z1, ξ2z2, · · · , ξJzJ)−
J∑
j=1
γjzj(ξj − ρ)], (54)
or, more concisely,
(Bf)(z) = min
γ
max
{ξj∈[dj ,uj ]}
[f(ξ ◦ z)− (γ, ξ ◦ z − ρz)]. (55)
This leads to the following result from [7].
Theorem 7.1. The minimal value of X0 for which the income of the investor is non-
negative (and which by definition is the hedge price Hn in the n-step game) is given by
Hn =
1
ρn
(Bnf)(S10 , · · · , S
J
0 ). (56)
We shall now develop a method for evaluating the operator (54) showing in particular
how naturally the risk-neutral probability laws appear, as if by miracle, in this evaluation.
The proof of all results below (and its various extensions) can be found in [9].
Let us say that a probability law µ ∈ P(E) on a compact set E ⊂ Rd is risk-neutral
with respect to the origin, or shortly, risk-neutral if the origin is its barycenter, that is∫
E
ξµ(dξ) = 0. The set of all risk-neutral laws on E will be denoted by Prn(E).
Let us say that a finite family of vectors E = {ξ1, · · · , ξk} in R
d is in general position if
the vectors of any subset of {ξ1, · · · , ξk} of size d are linearly independent (in particular,
all vectors in E are non-vanishing). A subset E ⊂ Rd is called (strongly) positively
complete, if there exists no ω ∈ Rd such that (ω, ξ) ≥ 0 for all ξ ∈ E.
Proposition 7.1. Let a finite set E = {ξ1, · · · , ξd+1} be strongly positively complete
in Rd. Then the family E is in general position and there exists a unique risk-neutral
probability law {p1, · · · , pd+1} on {ξ1, · · · , ξd+1}, with
pi = C
−1(−1)i−1 det


ξ11 · · · ξ
1
i−1 ξ
1
i+1 · · · ξ
1
d+1
ξ21 · · · ξ
2
i−1 ξ
2
i+1 · · · ξ
2
d+1
· · ·
ξd1 · · · ξ
d
i−1 ξ
d
i+1 · · · ξ
d
d+1

 , i = 1, · · · , d, (57)
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where
C = det


1 1 · · · 1
ξ11 ξ
1
2 · · · ξ
1
d+1
· · ·
ξd1 ξ
d
2 · · · ξ
d
d+1

 . (58)
For arbitrary k we have the following.
Proposition 7.2. Let a family E = {ξ1, · · · , ξk} be strongly positively complete and in
general position. Then the extreme points of the convex set of risk-neutral probabilities
on {ξ1, · · · , ξk} are risk-neutral probabilities with supports on strongly positively complete
subsets of E of size precisely d+ 1.
Now we are going to evaluate the minimax expression
Π[ξ1, · · · , ξk](f) = inf
γ∈Rd
max
i
[f(ξi)− (ξi, γ)]. (59)
Theorem 7.2. Let a family of vectors ξ1, · · · , ξk in R
d be strongly positively complete
and in general position. Then
Π[ξ1, · · · , ξk](f) = max
µ
Eµf(ξ), (60)
where max is taken over all extreme points µ of risk-neutral laws on {ξ1, · · · , ξk}, given
by Proposition 7.2, and inf in (59) is attained on a certain finite γ.
Changing variables ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξJ) to η = ξ ◦ z yields
(Bf)(z1, ..., zJ ) =
1
ρ
min
γ
max
{η∈[zidi,ziui]}
[f(η)−
J∑
i=1
γi(ηi − ρzi)], (61)
or, by shifting,
(Bf)(z1, ..., zJ) =
1
ρ
min
γ
max
{η∈[zi(di−ρ),zi(ui−ρ)]}
[f(η + ρz)− (γ, η)]. (62)
Assuming f is convex (which is often the case for option payoffs), we can apply Theorem
7.2, where max is taken over the set of vectors
ηI = ξI ◦ z − ρz,
being the vertices of the rectangular parallelepiped
Πz,ρ = ×
J
i=1[z
i(di − ρ), z
i(ui − ρ)],
where
ξI = {di|i∈I , uj|j /∈I},
are the vertices of
Π = ×Ji=1[di, ui], (63)
parametrized by all subsets (including the empty one) I ⊂ {1, . . . , J}.
Since the origin is an internal point of Π (because di < ρ < ui), the family {ηI} is
strongly positively complete. The condition of general position is rough in the sense that
it is fulfilled for an open dense subset of pairs (di, ui). Applying Theorem 7.2 to (62) and
returning back to ξ yields the following.
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Theorem 7.3. If the vertices ξI of the parallelepiped Π are in general position in the
sense that for any J subsets I1, · · · , IJ , the vectors {ξIk − ρ1}
J
k=1 are independent in R
J ,
then
(Bf)(z) =
1
ρ
max
{Ω}
EΩf(ξ ◦ z), z = (z
1, · · · , zJ), (64)
where {Ω} is the collection of all subsets Ω = ξI1, · · · , ξIJ+1 of the set of vertices of Π, of
size J + 1, such that their convex hull contains ρ1 as an interior point (1 is the vector
with all coordinates 1), and where EΩ denotes the expectation with respect to the unique
probability law {pI}, ξI ∈ Ω, on the set of vertices of Π, which is supported on Ω and is
risk-neutral with respect to ρ1, that is∑
I⊂{1,...,J}
pIξI = ρ1. (65)
Risk-neutrality now corresponds to its usual meaning in finance, i.e. (65) means that
all discounted stock prices are martingales.
Notice that the max in (64) is over a finite number of explicit expressions, which
is of course a great achievement as compared with initial minmax over an infinite set.
In particular, it reduces the calculation of the iterations Bnf to the calculation on a
controlled Markov chain. Let us also stress that the number of eligible Ω in (64) is the
number of different pyramids (convex polyhedrons with J+1 vertices) with vertices taken
from the vertices of Π and containing ρ1 as an interior point. Hence this number can be
effectively calculated.
Let us point our some properties of the operator B given by (64) that are obvious, but
important for practical calculations: ρB is non-expansive:
‖B(f1)− B(f2)‖ ≤
1
ρ
‖f1 − f2‖,
and homogeneous (both with respect to addition and multiplication):
ρB(λ + f) = λ+ ρB(f), B(λf) = λB(f)
for any function f and λ ∈ R (resp. λ > 0) for the first (resp second) equation.
Next, if fp is a power function, that is
fp(z) = (z
1)i1 · · · (zJ )iJ ,
then fp(ξ ◦ z) = fp(ξ)fp(z), implying
(Bnfp)(z) = ((Bfp)(1))
nfp(z). (66)
Therefore, power functions are invariant under B (up to a multiplication by a constant).
Consequently, if for a payoff f one can find a reasonable approximation by a power
function, that is there exists a power function fp such that ‖f − fp‖ ≤ ǫ, then
‖Bnf − λnfp‖ ≤
1
ρn
‖f − fp‖ ≤
ǫ
ρn
, λ = (Bfp)(1), (67)
so that an approximate calculation of Bnf is reduced to the calculation of one number λ.
This implies the following scheme for an approximate evaluation of B: first find the best
fit to f in terms of functions α+ fp (where fp is a power function and α a constant), and
then use (67).
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